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IGNORANCE IS NOT BLISS: RESPONSIBLE
CORPORATE OFFICERS CONVICTED OF
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES AND THE
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
LISA ANN HARIG
[O]ne ... does not have to be bad to do bad when it comes to
environmental crimes. The "black heart" requirement commonly
associated with other criminal activity is not necessary to sustain
a conviction.'
INTRODUCTION
Each of the last three decades has seen a representative
white-collar crime capture public attention. In the 1960s, the media
covered antitrust violations of the Electrical Equipment conspiracy
that met secretly to fix prices.2 The focus in the 1970s was on
corporate bribery and political corruption.' The crime of the 1980s
was insider trading
During the latter part of the 1980s and now into this decade,
environmental crimes have become the focus of much media cov-
erage and public attention. One result of this attention has been
an increase in the number of criminal suits brought against corpo-
rations and their officers for environmental violations.5 The num-
ber of such criminal prosecutions has increased steadily in both
19906 and 1991.' In addition to this increase in criminal prosecu-
1. Judson W. Starr & Thomas J. Kelly Jr., Environmental Crimes and the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines: The Time Has Come ... and It Is Hard Time, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. News
& Analysis (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,096, 10,104 (1990).
2. John C. Coffee, Jr., Hush! The Criminal Status of Confidential Information After
McNally and Carpenter and the Enduring Problem of Overcriminalization, 26 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 121, 121 (1988).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Robert W. Adler & Charles Lord, Environmental Crimes: Raising the Stakes, 59
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 781, 790 (1991). *
6. EPA Continues to Exceed Previous Numbers in Civil, Criminal Cases, Penalty
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tions,, the penalties involved (both fines and prison time) have
been greatly enhanced by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.'
Another response to the growing awareness of environmental
crimes has been the expansion of the "responsible corporate offi-
cer doctrine" in the area of environmental law. Although this
doctrine has been, applied to public welfare statutes generally since
the 1940s, it has only recently been widely applied to environmen-
tal statutes.
The responsible corporate officer doctrine was developed in a
series of cases dealing with strict liability public welfare statutes.
It evolved from the "responsible share doctrine," under which
corporate officers were subject to strict liability for acts or omis-
sions of their companies in which they had a "responsible share,"
without regard to their direct participation in and knowledge of
such acts or omissions
Assessments, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1534 (Dec. 7, 1990) [hereinafter EPA Continues to
Exceed Previous Numbers]. EPA Administrator William K. Reilly reported that the agen-
cy referred 65 criminal cases to the Justice Department in fiscal year 1990, an increase of
five cases from fiscal year 1989. One hundred individuals and corporations were charged
with criminal violations, 32 of which were successfully prosecuted. Id.
7. Enforcement Actions at EPA Continue to Climb in Civil, Criminal Cases, Penalty
Assessments, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1832 (Nov. 29, 1991) [hereinafter Enforcement Actions
at EPA]. Enforcement actions reached an all-time high in fiscal year 1991. One hundred
four defendants, including both individuals and corporations, were charged with criminal
violations that year. ,Of these, a total of 72 defendants (45 individuals and 27 organiza-
tions) were convicted and sentenced in the 48 successful cases. Id.
8. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL (1992) [herein-
after GUIDELINES MANUAL], reprinted in 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, at 64 (West Supp. 1992).
Fines increased dramatically during fiscal year 1990, due in part to one unusually
large penalty. Fines imposed rose from $12.7 million in fiscal year 1989 to $30 million in
fiscal year 1990. EPA Continues to Exceed Previous Numbers, supra note 6, at 1534.
Fifteen million of the $30 million 1990 total came from the Texas Eastern Gas Pipeline
Co. It was the largest single settlement in EPA history. Id.
Sentences that included jail time were not unusual in fiscal 1990. Defendants were
sentenced to a total of 745 months of imprisonment, resulting in 222 months of ordered
incarceration after suspension of sentences. The Justice Department reported that more
than half of the individuals convicted for environmental crimes were sentenced to prison
time. Id. Aboui half of those sentenced were actually serving time in prison. The EPA
reported that the sentences averaged more than one year. Id
More than double the jail time was served in fiscal 1991 as in 1989. Further, crim-
inal judgments resulted in significantly longer sentences. Enforcement Actions at EPA,
supra note 7, at 1832; see also Starr & Kelly, supra note 1, at 10,096 ("One thing that
can be said with certainty about these new rules is that criminal enforcement of the
environmental laws has been vigorously and zealously augmented.").
9. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 673-74 (1975); United States v. Dotterweich,
320 U.S. 277, 284 (1943).
RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE OFFICERS
Although the responsible corporate officer doctrine was first
applied in cases involving strict liability public welfare statutes, the
doctrine was later applied in cases involving public welfare statutes
containing a scienter requirement." In the context of environmen-
tal crimes, this application has meant that, at the very least, the
government has a greatly reduced burden of proof. Some cases
even suggest that responsible corporate officers may be held strict-
ly liable under statutes that, as written, require the government to
prove mens rea."
These developments are particularly disturbing in light of the
severity of punishment mandated by the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. The Guidelines have substantially increased the proba-
bility that the convicted defendant will be sentenced to jail time
and will actually serve time in jail."
This Note evaluates the responsible corporate officer doctrine
and its relationship to the Sentencing Guidelines. Part I describes
the development of the doctrine, from its origins in strict liability
public welfare laws, to its expansion into environmental laws with
a scienter requirement. Part II discusses the applicable parts of the
Sentencing Guidelines and their relationship to the responsible
corporate officer doctrine. Part III suggests that while corporate
officers should continue to be prosecuted for environmental viola-
tions, convictions under the responsible corporate officer doctrine
should be grounds for downward departures in sentencing under
the Guidelines. The responsible corporate officer doctrine should
only be applied to crimes having a scienter requirement insofar as
it advances the goals of the criminal justice system. 4 Allowing
downward departures from the Sentencing Guidelines will best
serve these interests, as well as ensure that the sentencing system
will be perceived as fair and reasonable.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 40-74.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 40-74..
12. See infra text accompanying notes 40-74. In these cases, all the government need
establish is that the defendant was a responsible corporate officer.
13. Judson W. Starr & Thomas J. Kelly Jr., Environmental Crimes and the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, NAT'L ENvTL. ENFORCEMENT J., June 1990, at 3, 8-12.
14. The goals of the criminal justice system include prevention, restraint, rehabilita-
tion, deterrence, education, and retribution. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT,
JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5, at 22-27 (2d ed. 1986).
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I. THE RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE OFFICER DOCTRINE
The responsible corporate officer doctrine developed in the
context of misdemeanor prosecutions under public welfare statutes
with no scienter requirement. From this narrow beginning, the
doctrine has expanded to include felony violations under statutes
with a mens rea element. As public concern for the environment
has grown, so has the doctrine's coverage to include corporate
officers who violate environmental statutes.
A. Prosecution Under Strict Liability Public Welfare Statutes
"The 'responsible corporate officer doctrine' evolved in a
series of cases involving violations of strict liability statutes."'5
Strict liability for corporate actors was based on the theory that
conventional mens rea requirements" are too heavy a burden on
the justice system in cases involving public welfare statutes. The
Supreme Court first addressed this burden in Shevlin-Carpenter Co.
v. Minnesota,17 and determined that due process is not violated by
public welfare statutes lacking a scienter requirement.'8 The Court
stated that "public policy may require that in the prohibition or
punishment of particular acts it may be provided that he who shall
do them shall do them at his peril and will not be heard to plead
in defense good faith or ignorance."'9
In United States v. Balint,0 the Court once again upheld the
constitutionality of strict liability public welfare statutes. This time,
the Court relied on Shevlin-Carpenter to reject the defendants' due
process argument: "While the general rule at common law was
that the scienter was a necessary element in the indictment and
proof of every crime . . . , there has been a modification of this
15. Thruxtun Hare, Comment, Reluctant Soldiers: The Criminal Liability of Corporate
Officers for Negligent Violations of the Clean Water Act, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 935, 967
(1990).
16. Generally, conventional mens rea "requires that the actor must be aware of the
factors making his conduct criminal." Id. at 969.
17. 218 U.S. 57 (1910).
18. Id. at 67-70. The defendant corporation was convicted of violating a statute that
forbade the removal, without a valid permit, of timber from state lands. Id. at 62-63.
The statute included incarceration as a possible punishment. Id. at 62 n.1.
19. Id. at 70.
20. 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
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view in respect to prosecutions under statutes the purpose of
which would be obstructed by such a requirement."'"
Over twenty years later, in United States v. Dotterweich,' the
Court applied the public welfare exception to the scienter require-
ment to corporate officers and created the responsible share doc-
trine. In Dotterweich, the president and general manager of a
pharmaceutical company had been convicted of violating the feder-
al Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)' by shipping mis-
branded products. Although the shipment had been accidental,24
the Court nonetheless upheld the defendant's conviction. While ac-
knowledging that a conviction without proof of any criminal intent
on the part of the defendant may be harsh in some instances,'
the Court concluded that:
Balancing relative hardships, Congress has preferred to place it
upon those who have at least the opportunity of informing them-
selves of the existence of conditions imposed for the protection
of consumers before sharing in illicit commerce, rather than to
throw the hazard on the innocent public who are wholly help-
less.'
The Court also discussed the concept of an actor's "responsi-
ble share." The Court held that "[t]he offense is committed ... by
all who do have such a responsible share in the furtherance of the
transaction which the statute outlaws"; 7 and that the trier of fact
must determine whether the person's conduct amounts to a "re-
sponsible share."'
Some authors have commented that the concept of responsi-
ble share contains an implicit allegation of negligent conduct2 9 as
21. Id. at 251-52.
22. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
23. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-393 (1988). Section 331(a) prohibits "[t]he introduction or
delivery for introduction into interstate commerce of any . . . drug . . . that is adulterat-
ed or misbranded." At the time the case was adjudicated, § 333(a) made it a misde-
meanor for any "person" to violate a provision of § 331. 21 U.S.C. § 333(a) (1940).
Strict liability for a felony violation of a public welfare statute was established by United
States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 607-10 (1971).
24. The company did not manufacture the drugs, but merely repackaged them with
their own label without knowledge of their alteration. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 278.
25. Id. at 284.
26. Id. at 285.
27. Id. at 284.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Norman Abrams, Criminal Liability of Corporate Officers for Strict
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one author put it, "[t]he word 'responsible' itself reflects some
notion of culpability."" In Dotterweich, this negligence arose from
the fact that "the officer was in a position of control and, since a
violation occurred, the officer presumably failed in his duty to
prevent that violation."31
The responsible corporate officer doctrine evolved from the
responsible share doctrine more than thirty years later in United
States v. Park.' Like Dotterweich, Park involved a violation of
the FDCA3 In this case, the president of Acme Markets, a na-
tional retail food chain, was convicted of allowing food received
via interstate commerce and held for sale in a warehouse, to be
stored in a building accessible to, and contaminated by, rodents.'
The Court narrowed somewhat the reach of the responsible share
doctrine: It acknowledged that responsible share included "some
measure of blameworthiness."35 Nevertheless, it stated that the
government need only prove that the defendant had, "by reason of
his position in the corporation, responsibility and authority either
to prevent in the first instance, or promptly to correct, the viola-
tion complained of, and that he failed to do so."36 The Court also
held that while the defendant can claim that he was powerless to
prevent or correct the violation, the defendant carries the burden
of producing evidence of his own powerlessness. 7
Under Park, corporate officers have been held criminally
liable for environmental crimes even if they committed no overt
act and had no intent or even knowledge of blameworthiness. 8
Liability Offenses-A Comment on Dotterweich and Park, 28 UCLA L. REV. 463, 466
(1981); Hare, supra note 15, at 972.
30. Abrams, supra note 29, at 465.
31. Hare, supra note 15, at 972.
32. 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
33. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-393 (1988). Section 331(k) prohibits:
The alteration, mutilation, destruction, obliteration, or removal of the whole or
any part of the labeling of, or the doing of any other act with respect to, a
food, drug, device, or cosmetic, if such act is done while such article is held for
sale (whether or not the first sale) after shipment in interstate commerce and
results in such article being adulterated or misbranded.
34. Park, 421 U.S. at 660. An FDA Consumer Safety officer who had inspected the
building found mouse pellets and a hole chewed in one of the boxes. Id. at 662 n.4.
35. Under Park, corporate officers may not be held criminally liable merely on the
basis of the title of their positions. Instead, accountability is to be based on the
responsibilities and authority of their positions. Id. at 673.
36. Id. at 673-74.
37. Id. at 673.
38. A more recent case suggests that this elimination of both the actus reus as well
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Their omissions need not even have amounted to negligence.'
The government need only prove that the corporate officer was in
a position to prevent or correct the violation and failed to do so.
B. Prosecution Under Public Welfare Statutes with a Scienter
Requirement
Regardless of how they have interpreted "knowledge," courts
have minimized the government's burden of proving it in cases
involving public welfare statutes containing a scienter requirement.
The responsible corporate officer doctrine has extended beyond
the realm of cases involving strict liability public welfare statutes
to apply to these cases as well. Knowledge will often be imputed
from employees of the corporation to its responsible officers. At
the very least, the trier of fact may infer knowledge from the
circumstances surrounding the case.
In United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp.,'
the Supreme Court held that the word "knowingly" in the statute
at issue pertained to knowledge of the facts, not to knowledge of
the regulation itself or to the violation of the regulation.4 Thus,
the corporate officer only had to know that the shipment was
made; he did not have to be aware that a regulation governed the
shipment or that such regulation had been violated. The Court
stated that when dangerous products are involved, "the probability
of regulation is so great that anyone who is aware that he is in
possession of them or dealing with them must be presumed to be
aware of the regulation."42 Thus, knowledge of the regulation may
be imputed to the defendant through his knowledge of the facts
. surrounding the violation. In his dissent, Justice Stewart stated that
as the mens rea requirement will be reserved for cases involving "conduct that a reason-
able person should know is subject, to stringent public regulation and may seriously
threaten the community's health or safety." Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 433
(1985).
39. Ann Hopkins, Comment, Mens Rea and the Right to Trial by Jury, 76 CAL. L.
REV. 391, 411 (1988).
40. 402 U.S. 558 (1971). The defendant in International Minerals was charged with
shipping sulfuric and hydrofluosilicic acids in interstate commerce without indicating on
the shipping papers that they were classified as Corrosive Liquids, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 834(a). 18 U.S.C. § 834(f) state that whoever "knowingly violates any such
regulation" shall be fined or imprisoned. Law of Sept. 6, 1960, ch. 645, § 834(f), 74 Stat.
810 (repealed 1979).
41. 402 U.S. at 563.
42. Id. at 565.
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the majority's holding meant that a person who had never heard
of the regulation might make a single shipment in his lifetime and
be guilty of a criminal offense punishable by a year in prison.43
In the landmark case of United States v. Johnson & Towers,
Inc.,' the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)45
requires knowledge both of the regulation and of the violation.46
The defendants in this case were charged with pumping hazardous
wastes into a trench that flowed into a creek without a permit. 7
Although RCRA required the defendants to have a permit for
such activity, the defendants neither applied for nor were issued a
permit.48 The court expanded the traditional view that only own-
ers or operators of the facility could be held responsible if they
"knew or should have known" that their company had not com-
plied with RCRA's permit requirement. 9 The court found that in
this case, the defendants, mid-level managers who had supervised
and directed the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous
wastes, could be subject to criminal prosecution if it were shown
that they knew or should have known of the company's failure to
comply with the permit requirement.'
Although the Third Circuit required knowledge both of the
regulation and of the violation, the outcome in Johnson & Towers
43. Id. at 569 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
44. 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985).
45. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(k) (1988). Prior to 1984, § 6928(d) provided:
Any person who-
(2) knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste identified
or listed under this subchapter either-
(A) without having obtained a permit under section 6925 of this title
...or
(B) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of
such permit . . .
shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine of not more than '$25,000...
for each day of violation, or to imprisonment not to exceed one year .... or
both ....
42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1982). In 1984, Congress amended the wording of this provision
slightly, and increased the penalty to $50,000 per day of violation or two years of impris-
onment or both. Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-616, § 232(a)(3), 98 Stat. 3221, 3256-57.
46. 741 F.2d at 669.
47. Id. at 664.
48. Id.; see also RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6925 (1982).
49. 741 F.2d at 664.
50. Id. at 664-65.
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is essentially the same as in International Minerals. The Johnson &
Towers court stated that any knowledge, including knowledge of
the permit requirement, "may be inferred by the jury as to those
individuals who hold the requisite responsible positions with the
corporate defendant."51 Thus the burden on the prosecution under
Johnson & Towers is not significantly greater than it is under
International Minerals.
The Third Circuit has been criticized for its approach in John-
son & Towers. Most circuit courts have expressly or impliedly
declined to adopt its reasoning, and have instead made the
prosecution's burden of proof lighter. 2 The Eleventh Circuit, for
instance, held in United States v. Hayes International Corp.3 that
a conviction under RCRA's permit provision' requires only that
the defendant knew there was no permit for the disposal site, and
that the waste disposed of was a mixture of paint and a solvent.55
The defendant cannot claim in defense that he did not know that
such waste was hazardous within the meaning of the regulations,
or that he did not know a permit was required. 6
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit held in United States v. Hoflin57
that knowledge that a disposal permit had not been obtained was
not required for a conviction for improper disposal under RCRA.
The defendant in Hoflin was convicted of violating the same
RCRA provision as had been violated in Johnson & Towers."
The court based its reasoning on congressional intent: "Had Con-
gress intended knowledge of the lack of a permit to be an element
under subsection (A) it easily could have said so. It specifically
inserted a knowledge element in subsection (B), and it did so
51. Id. at 670."
52. See, e.g., United States v. Dean, 969 F.2d 187 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Baytank (Houston), Inc., 934 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d
1033 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1083 (1990). These cases are discussed infra
at notes 57-60, 64-65 and accompanying text.
53. 786 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(1) (1988).
55. 786 F.2d at 1505.
56. Id. at 1503. In reaching this decision, the court concluded that Liparota v. Unit-
ed States, 471 U.S. 419, 433 (1985), did not control in cases involving RCRA violations.
Id. at 1503; see supra note 38.
The Ninth Circuit recently followed Hayes International in holding that RCRA's
permit provision "requires proof that the defendant knew the facility lacked a permit."
United States v. Speach, 968 F.2d 795, 796 (9th Cir. 1992).
57. 880 F.2d 1033, 1038 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1083 (1990).
58. Id. at 1034; see supra note 45.
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notwithstanding the 'knowingly' modifier which introduces subsec-
tion (2).""9 The court also cited International Minerals in approval
of its presumption that anyone dealing in hazardous materials has
knowledge of the regulations governing them.'
In United States v. Dee,61 the Fourth Circuit held that the
defendants "knowingly" violated criminal provisions of RCRA
even though they were unaware that violation of RCRA was a
crime, or that RCRA regulations existed listing and identifying
chemical wastes as hazardous wastes.62 The evidence presented at
trial strongly indicated that the defendants were aware they were
dealing with hazardous chemicals, and that the chemicals were
"wastes" within the meaning of RCRA."
The next year, the Fifth Circuit followed Dee and Hoflin in
deciding United States v. Baytank (Houston), Inc.' The court stat-
ed that "'knowingly' means no more than that the defendant
knows factually what he is doing ... and it is not required that he
know that there is a regulation which says what he is storing is
hazardous under the RCRA."'65
In contrast to the preceding cases, in United States v.
MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co." the First Circuit held that
knowledge or belief that illegal shipments of the type alleged had
previously occurred was not enough to satisfy the scienter require-
ment of the statute at issue.67 The court stated, however, that
"knowledge may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, includ-
ing position and responsibility of defendants such as corporate
officers, as well as information provided to those defendants on
prior occasions."' The court continued:
59. 880 F.2d at 1038.
60. Id. The Sixth Circuit, agreeing with the reasoning in Hoflin, recently held that
"[t]he 'knowingly' which begins [RCRA] § 6928(d)(2) cannot be read as extending.to the
subsections without rendering nugatory the word 'knowing' contained in subsections
6928(d)(2)(B) and (C) .... [Subsection 6928(d)(2)(A)] does not require that the person
charged have known that a permit was required .... " United States v. Dean, 969 F.2d
187, 191 (6th Cir. 1992).
61. 912 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1307 (1991).
62. Id. at 745.
63. Id. at 745-46.
64. 934 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1991).
65. Id. at 613.
66. 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991).
67. Id. at 51.
68. Id. at 55.
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Simply because a responsible corporate officer believed that on a
prior occasion illegal transportation occurred, he did not neces-
sarily possess knowledge of the violation charged. In a crime
having knowledge as an express element, a mere showing of
official responsibility under Dotterweich and Park is not an ade-
quate substitute for direct or circumstantial proof of knowl-
edge.'
C. Expanding the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine: United
States v. Brittain
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit took an expan-
sive position in its consideration of the responsible corporate offi-
cer doctrine. United States v. Brittain70 involved the prosecution
under the Clean Water Act of the director of public utilities for
the city of Enid, Oklahoma. The defendant was convicted of "will-
fully or negligently" discharging pollutants into navigable waters in
noncompliance with the issued National Pollutant Discharge Elimi-
nation System (NPDES) permit.71
The defendant appealed his conviction on the theory that he
was not a criminally liable "person" as defined under the statute
because he was neither a permittee nor a responsible corporate
officer of the discharging permittee.' The court flatly rejected this
argument and held that the defendant was a person subject to
criminal liability under the Act. The court interpreted the specific
addition of responsible corporate officers to the Act as an expan-
sion of liability, reasoning that Congress added responsible corpo-
69. Id.
70. 931 F.2d 1413 (10th Cir. 1991).
71. Id. at 1418. At the time of the indictment, the applicable section of the Clean
Water Act provided, in part:
(1) Any person who willfully or negligently violates section 1311 ["the discharge
of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful" except as in compliance with
the law] ... of this title, or any' permit condition or limitation implementing
any of such sections in a permit issued under section 1342 [NPDES permit] of
this title by the Administrator ... shall be punished ....
(3) For the purposes of this subsection, the term "person" shall mean, in addi-
tion to the definition contained in section 1362(5) of this title [" 'person' means
an individual, corporation, partnership, association, State, municipality, commis-
sion, or political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body."], any responsi-
ble corporate officer.
33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1982).
72. Brittain, 931 F.2d at 1419.
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rate officers to the list of criminally liable persons in keeping with
the public welfare nature of the Clean Water Act.73 The court
further explained that "[u]nder this interpretation, a 'responsible
corporate officer,' to be held criminally liable, would not have to
'willfully or negligently' cause a permit violation. Instead, the will-
fulness or negligence of the actor would be imputed to him by
virtue of his position of responsibility."'74
The Brittain court borrowed the responsible corporate officer
doctrine from strict liability public welfare statutes and applied it
to public welfare statutes with a scienter requirement. Whereas
other courts have made the government's burden of proof fairly
light by allowing knowledge to be inferred from circumstantial
evidence, including the fact that the defendant was a responsible
corporate officer, the Tenth Circuit has effectively read the scien-
ter requirement out of public welfare statutes prosecutions when
responsible corporate officers are involved.
Brittain represents the broadest application yet of the respon-
sible corporate officer doctrine in the environmental law setting.
Growing concern for environmental crimes has prompted this
expansion; moreover, this concern is one reason why the United
States Sentencing Commission has increased the severity of sen-
tencing for environmental crimes.
II. THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
The application of the responsible corporate officer doctrine
to environmental violators is troubling when viewed in connection
with the harsh consequences of the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines.75 Not only has the responsible corporate officer doctrine
lowered the burden of proof for environmental crimes requiring
the defendant's knowledge, but the Guidelines have substantially
increased the probability that the convicted defendant will be sen-
tenced to jail time, and will actually serve time in jail.76
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8.
76. See Starr & Kelly, supra note 13, at 8-12.
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A. The Mechanics of the Guidelines
Prior to 1987, defendants convicted of federal environmental
crimes were sentenced according to the criminal penalty provisions
of the statutes they violated.' Since 1987, defendants have been
subject to sentences imposed under the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines.8
The Guidelines include specific provisions for sentencing envi-
ronmental violators79 and put environmental crimes on a par with
other white-collar crimes.' Some commentators have suggested
that in terms of punishment, the new rules move environmental
crimes closer to serious crimes of violence."1 The Guidelines are
especially hard on environmental violators because the United
States Sentencing Commission was "aware that Congress has ex-
pressed views in favor of tougher penalties for white-collar offens-
es .... Environm ental offenses can-and quite often do-pose a
threat to society that far outweighs their number."'  Therefore,
judges have been forced to take environmental crimes much more
seriously than they have in the past.3
Under the Guidelines, environmental offenses are divided into
four categories:
(1) knowing endangerment of human life;
(2) offenses involving hazardous or toxic substances;
77. See Adler & Lord, supra note 5, at 797 app. D.
78. See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8. The United States Sentencing Commis-
sion is an eight-member panel established by the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984, 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988). In 1987, the Commission published the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines. Two important goals of the Guidelines are: first, "ensur[ing] propor-
tionality in sentencing among defendants found guilty of similar conduct," and second,
"remov[ing] the uncertainty that previously characterized the sentencing process." Starr &
Kelly, supra note 1, at 10,096-97. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
act creating the Sentencing Commission and the Guidelines in Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989).
The Criminal Fine Improvements Act of 1987 also affected the sentences given to
environmental violators, but it is not within the scope of this Note. Pub. L. No. 100-185,
101 Stat. 1279 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). For a discussion of the Act,
see Adler & Lord, supra note 5, at 799-800.
79. GUIDELNES MANUAL, supra note 8, §§ 2Q1.1-2Q2.1.
80. Starr & Kelly, supra note 1, at 10,096.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 10,097 n.6 (quoting Judge William A. Wilkins, Chairman, U.S. Sentencing
Commission, Address at the National Conference on Local and State Enforcement of the
Environmental Laws (Mar. 30, 1989)).
83. Id. at 10,096.
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(3) offenses involving other pollutants; and
(4) offenses against conservation and wildlife.'
The Guidelines have changed the way that judges may impose
sentences.85 The traditional flexibility judges have enjoyed in sen-
tencing has been replaced with rigid guidelines removing virtually
all discretion for sentencing certain crimes, including environmental
offenses.86 Each offense category has a base penalty level for
knowing violations of environmental statutes. That penalty level
may increase if, for example, pollutants are released into the envi-
ronment, if the violation is ongoing or continuous, or if the defen-
dant has a criminal historyY The penalty level may decrease if
the violation resulted from negligence, or involved only record-
keeping or reporting." Prior to the Guidelines, probation in lieu
of jail time and suspension of prison sentences were commonplace
in the sentencing of environmental violators.89 However, judges
are no longer free to utilize such sentencing practices. A solely
probationary term (i.e., one without any time in jail) is available
only to defendants convicted of offenses with penalty levels of 1 to
6.' Defendants convicted of crimes that carry penalty levels of 7
to 10 may be eligible for probation with a condition of intermit-
tent or community incarceration or home detention.9' Further-
more, the new guidelines do not permit suspended sentences.'
Consequently, "[j]ail time will become the norm rather than the
exception under the new rules."'93
Consider, for instance, the defendant in Hofin94 who re-
ceived two years of probation for his RCRA conviction.5 Had
the defendant's violations occurred after November 1, 1987 (the
effective date of the Sentencing Guidelines), his sentence would
84. Adler & Lord, supra note 5, at 798. This Note does not include a discussion of
conservation and wildlife offenses.
85. For a more detailed discussion of sentencing under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, see Starr & Kelly, supra note 13, at 4-6.
86. For example, sentences are now determinate, and parole has been abolished. Id.
at 3.
87. Adler & Lord, supra note 5, at 798.
88. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, § 2Q1.1 to .3.
89. Adler & Lord, supra note 5, at 798-99..
90. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, §§ 5A, 5B1.1(a).
91. Id.
92. Adler & Lord, supra note 5, at 799.
93. Starr & Kelly, supra note 1, at 10,097.
94. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
95. Starr & Kelly, supra note 13, at 7.
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have been significantly higher. His violations would have resulted
in an offense level of 16,96 for a sentencing range of twenty-one
to twenty-seven months in prison. 7 Furthermore, the sentencing
judge would not have been permitted to suspend the sentence in
favor of probation at that offense level.
B. Departures from the Guidelines
In addition to setting a base offense level for each of the
categories of environmental violations, the Sentencing Guidelines
also allow for departures, under limited circumstances, from these
base levels." According to its policy statement, the Guidelines
permit a court to impose a sentence outside of the base level
sentencing range "if the court finds 'that there exists an aggravat-
ing or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not ade-
quately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in
formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different
from that described.' 99
One of the enumerated grounds for departure is public wel-
fare.1" The policy statement reads: "If national security, public
health, or safety was significantly endangered, the court may in-
crease the sentence above the guideline range to reflect the nature
and circumstances of the offense."'' This possible increase in
sentencing has special applicability to environmental defendants.
Because environmental statutes are considered public welfare laws,
violations potentially endanger public health or safety."° Thus,
96. Id. Hoflin's base offense level for mishandling of a hazardous substince would
have been 8 under the Guidelines. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, § 2Q1.2. He
would have received a four-level upward adjustment for discharge, release, or emission of
a hazardous substance, and an additional four-level upward adjustment for disposing of
paint wastes without a permit. Id. §§ 2Q1.2(b)(1)(B), 2Q1.2(b)(4).
97. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, at 280.
98. Id. §§ 5K1.1-5K2.16.
99. Id. § 5K2.0 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988)). The policy statement contin-
ues:
Circumstances that may warrant departure from the guidelines pursuant to this
provision cannot, by their very nature, be comprehensively listed and analyzed
in advance. The controlling decision as to whether and to what extent departure
is warranted can only be made by the courts .... [T]he court may depart
from the guidelines, even though the reason for departure is taken into consid-
eration in the guidelines . . . if the court determines that, in light of unusual
circumstances, the guideline level attached to that factor is inadequate.
Id.
100. Id. § 5K2.14.
101. Id. (emphasis added).
102. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes International Corp., 786 F2d 1499, 1503 (11th
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the sentences of responsible corporate officers for environmental
violations can be increased if the violations are believed by the
sentencing judge to have been of a degree of seriousness not fully
taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission.
The Guidelines that deal with environmental offenses specifi-
cally state that they apply to knowing violations. 3 Some of the
accompanying Application Notes state, however, that negligent
conduct may warrant a downward departure in sentencing."° Ac-
cordingly, a sentencing judge can give a sentence shorter than that
required by the Guidelines if he believes that the defendant's
conduct was merely negligent.
III. CONVICTION UNDER THE RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE
OFFICER DOCTRINE AS GROUNDS FOR DOWNWARD
DEPARTURE FROM THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES
Coinciding with the increased penalties for environmental
violations is the expansion of the responsible corporate officer
doctrine in the area of environmental law. This expansion is most
likely the result of at least two phenomena. First, the dramatic
increase in the number of prosecutions"5 of environmental crimes
has brought the issue of corporate officer criminal liability in the
environmental setting before the courts in large numbers. The
complete importation of the responsible corporate officer doctrine
into environmental prosecutions reflects the perceived importance
of these statutes to the public health and welfare.
Second, public awareness about the importance of preserving
the environment has grown. Congress has responded by
criminalizing violations of environmental regulations."° The Unit-
ed States Sentencing Commission, in turn, has responded by en-
hancing the penalties for environmental crimes significantly."°
Cir. 1986) (stating that RCRA is "undeniably a public welfare statute").
103. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, § 2Q1.1 (entitled "Knowing Endangerment
Resulting From Mishandling Hazardous or Toxic Substances, Pesticides or Other Pollut-
ants"); id. § 2Q1.2 applic. n.4 (noting that "this section assumes knowing conduct"); id. §
2Q1.3 applic. n.3 (noting that "[t]he specific offense charActeristics in this section assume
knowing conduct").
104. Id. § 2Q1.2 applic. n.4; id. § 2Q1.3 applic. n.3.
105. See supra notes 6-8.
106. Judson W. Starr, Countering Environmental Crimes, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 379, 379-80 (1986).
107. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
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This Note contends that the Sentencing Commission did not
adequately take the responsible corporate officer doctrine into
account when it drafted the Guidelines. This doctrine should be
considered in sentencing decisions as a basis for downward depar-
tures for two reasons: First, while the Guidelines assume knowing-
conduct, the responsible corporate officer doctrine allows the trier
of fact to impute knowledge to the defendant. Thus, corporate
officers convicted under this doctrine will be sentenced the same
way as an actor with actual knowledge. Second, longer sentences
that are perceived as noncommensurate with the crimes may dis-
courage prosecution and conviction of environmental criminals.
First, the Guidelines that apply to environmental violations
state that they "assume knowing conduct.' '""a They also state that
a judge may consider whether the conduct was merely negligent,
and adjust the sentence accordingly."° The Guidelines do not
mention either responsible corporate officers or strict liability.
However, because the responsible corporate officer doctrine is
central to criminal environmental prosecutions, it is worthy of con-
sideration at the sentencing level. In fact, the responsible corporate
officer doctrine is so pervasive in such prosecutions that conviction
under the doctrine should be listed specifically as a ground for a
downward departure under the Guidelines.
No court has ever explicitly stated that the responsible corpo-
rate officer doctrine is a negligence standard, and no court is likely
ever to do so. The responsible corporate officer doctrine is viewed
as a reduction in the burden of proof that the government is re-
quired to meet. It is not labelled a negligence standard, and re-
sponsible corporate officers would not be eligible for downward
departures from Guidelines sentencing ranges on this ground.1 '
However, at least one commentator has argued that most courts
are likely to agree with Justice Stewart's dissent in United States v.
Park that the majority did in fact adopt a negligence standard,
despite its never explicitly mentioning negligence.' Then, be-
cause the Guidelines allow for downward departures for negli-
108. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
110. Although the concept of "responsible share" as defined by the Dotterweich court,
discussed supra at notes 22-31 and accompanying text, may imply an allegation of negli-
gence, Park held that the defendant's omission did not even have to amount to negli-
gence; see supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
111. Abrams, supra note 29, at 469-70.
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gence, they should also allow for downward departures for convic-
tions under the responsible corporate officer doctrine-the ratio-
nale in both cases being that defendants who lacked knowledge of
crimes committed should not be punished as severely as those who
possessed knowledge.
There is evidence that Congress wanted the Sentencing Com-
mission to consider factors that are directly related to the responsi-
ble corporate officer doctrine. The Commission has been criticized
for failing to consider the personal characteristics of the offender
in promulgating the Sentencing Guidelines."' One commentator
has noted that the defendant's role in the offense and his depen-
dence upon criminal activity for a livelihood, among other factors,
were ignored by the Commission, despite Congress's recommenda-
tion that they be considered.' Under the responsible corporate
officer doctrine, consideration of the defendant's role is especially
important. The prosecution is not required to prove actual knowl-
edge in these cases; knowledge may be imputed to the defendant
or inferred from the existing circumstances.114 Often, the responsi-
ble corporate officer will have played no role in the offense other
than having failed to prevent it. A downward departure would
better reflect the actual role of the responsible corporate officer in
the offense.
Second, longer sentences may discourage prosecution and
conviction of environmental criminals. For the criminal justice
system to work, punishment must be perceived by the public as
fair and commensurate with the severity of the offense.'15 Con-
victing responsible corporate officers of crimes of which they had
no actual knowledge may be a reasonable approach to dealing
with environmental violations; but sentencing them to long prison
terms is neither just, nor commensurate with their- offenses.
In addition, the possibility of excessive prison terms may
actually discourage conviction of corporate officers."6 One of the
112. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1938, 1953 (1988).
113. Id.
114. See supra notes 40-74 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Brittain,
931 F.2d 1413, 1419 (10th Cir. 1991) (stating that responsible corporate officers can be
held strictly liable for offenses of their corporations).
115. See Joann L. Miller et al., Felony Punishments: A Factorial Survey of Perceived
Justice in Criminal Sentencing, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 396, 396 (1991).
116. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Justice Principles of Federal Prosecution, 27 Crim.
L. Rep. (BNA) 3277, 3282 (Aug. 6, 1980) (advising prosecutors, in cases involving man-
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concerns of opponents of the Sentencing Guidelines was that in-
creased penalties would result in fewer prosecutions because the
government would file charges only against the most serious of-
fenders. While juries may be concerned about the environmental
welfare of this nation, they are likely to sympathize with individ-
uals who will face jail sentences for crimes of which they had no
actual knowledge."' In fact, "it is often difficult for courts to im-
pose jail sentences" on responsible corporate officers."'
Not only may juries be negatively affected, but prosecutors
may be discouraged from bringing criminal charges against envi-
ronmental violators if the penalties are too great. Given the high
penalties of conviction, the government may decide to bring suit
against only the most flagrant violators. Thus responsible corporate
officers of corporations who are guilty of lesser violations would
have no incentive to attempt to prevent environmental violations.
The primary goal of criminal prosecutions of environmental
crimes is deterrence,"9 and the responsible corporate officer doc-
trine is an effective way of achieving that goal. Holding responsi-
ble corporate officers criminally liable for the actions of their
companies is intended to encourage corporations to police the
actions of their employees and to initiate programs that will pre-
vent environmental violations before they occur.2 ' One commen-
tator has stated that the Guidelines mean that "environmental con-
victions are likely to have more serious consequences than in the
past, further supporting the need for internal corporate controls to
minimize the likelihood of violations altogether."'' Proponents of
aggressive criminal prosecution of corporate officers advocate im-
posing the "'sorts of penalties' that make pin-striped decision-mak-
ers go pale.'
datory minimum sentences, to consider that "unusually mitigating circumstances may make
the specified penalty appear so out of proportion to the seriousness of the defendant's
conduct that the jury or judge in assessing guilt . . . may be influenced by the inevitable
consequence of conviction")
117. Miller et al., supra note 115, at 414.
118. Starr, supra note 106, at 383.
119. Id. at 382.
120. Starr & Kelly, supra note 1, at 10,102.
121. Andrew S. Hogeland, Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws, 75 MASS. L.
REv. 112, 121 (1990).
122. Adler & Lord, supra note 5, at 796 (quoting Mark Muro, What Punishment Fits
a Corporate Crime?, BOSTON GLOBE, May 7, 1989, at Al, A6).
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The deterrent action of this doctrine will not be compromised
by allowing a downward departure from the Guidelines for a de-
fendant convicted under a responsible corporate officer theory. A
corporate officer" will be deterred by the threat of any jail term,
regardless of its length." It is unrealistic to think that a white-
collar professional will be less likely to try to prevent corporate
violations of environmental statutes because the possible jail time
is only 41 to 51 months, rather than 51 to 63 months.125 The true
deterrent effect of the Guidelines lies in the elimination of sus-
pended sentences and probation. The fact that most convicted
violators will serve some time in prison is what a responsible cor-
porate officer finds frightening; the length of the sentences is al-
most irrelevant. Thus, allowing a downward departure for responsi-
ble corporate officers will not decrease the deterrent effect of the
doctrine, although discouraging prosecution and/or conviction with
excessive prison terms will.
Although the courts have decided that public welfare dictates
that corporate officers have knowledge imputed to them or in-
ferred by the trier of fact from the surrounding circumstances, the
defendant's relative culpability should still be considered in sen-
tencing.'26 As one commentator has noted, "[r]egardless of the
extent of public need for protection from environmental harms,
the judicial criminal process is not excused from an accurate as-
sessment of culpability for convictions that may result in the loss
of a defendant's liberty."'"
A provision in the Guidelines that woild allow a downward
departure for conviction under the responsible corporate officer
doctrine would help ensure that sentences are perceived as just
123. See Starr, supra note 106, at 383 (describing the typical defendant in these cases
as "a 'successful' businessman, or otherwise prominent citizen without a prior criminal
record or other public blemish").
124. Hare, supra note 15, at 975 n.267 (commenting that "[flor corporate officers,
thirty days in jail is likely to be a very long time")
125. These figures assume a conviction under § 2Q1.1 (entitled "Knowing Endanger-
ment Resulting from Mishandling Hazardous or Toxic Substances, Pesticides or Other
Pollutants"), which has a base offense level of 24, and a two level decrease I suggest
should be used for "responsible corporate officer" status. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra
note 8, § 2Q1.1, at 280.
126. Andrew von Hirsh, Desert and White Collar Criminality: A Response to Dr.
Braithwaite, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1164, 1164-75 (1982) (arguing for "blame-
worthiness of criminal conduct as the proper determinant of the severity of punish-
ments").
127. Hare, supra note 15, at 978.
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and reasonable by the general public and prosecutors alike. This
will encourage respect for, and faith in, the criminal justice system.
IV. CONCLUSION
Public concern with environmental issues has resulted in in-,
creased criminal prosecutions of environmental violations, as well
as increased penalties for those convicted of such crimes. The
responsible corporate officer doctrine has been an important and
effective tool in these prosecutions. However, this doctrine has not
been adequately taken into account in the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines.
The government should continue to prosecute responsible
corporate officers for the environmental violations of their compa-
nies, as prosecutions of this type have an especially strong deter-
rent effect. However, the Sentencing Guidelines should be amend-
ed to allow for downward departures in sentencing when the de-
fendant is convicted under the responsible corporate officer doc-
trine. Downward departures would not decrease the deterrent
effect of the doctrine but would ensure that juries will continue to
convict corporate violators. Perhaps most importantly, it would
take relative culpability into account. Punishment commensurate to
the crime is vital to our criminal justice system, and should not be
forgotten in the punishment of environmental violators.
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